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Notes from the periphery: finding more than (non)ownership
in property law?
Estair Van Wagner
Abstract
Property law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the
world around us. In doing so, it shapes, but is also shaped by, our relationships with the places
we inhabit and encounter. Traditionally, non-owners are defined by their distance and
exclusion from the primary legal relationship and their lack of enforceable interests. Yet, land
use conflicts continue to arise because people routinely assert relationships with land and
resources that they are not formally recognised as owning but with which they are deeply
entangled. This chapter touches briefly on three examples: the relations of Indigenous Peoples
with fee simple lands within Canada; Māori ownership of freshwater in Aotearoa New Zealand;
and claims to public space made by unhoused persons. Though these people–place relations
are shaped by their legal definition as non-owner relations, purportedly severed and obscured
for legal decision-making, they continue to shape formal legal property relations. As such, they
deserve recognition as more than peripheral to property law. This chapter traces the assertion
of these ‘more-than-ownership’ relations as part of the necessary work of rebuilding a system
of property that sustains us as relational beings embedded in the complex materiality of places.
Keywords: Property Law; Non-ownership; Indigenous law; Aboriginal title; Homelessness
Property law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the
world around us. In doing so, it shapes, but is also shaped by, our relationships with the places
we inhabit and encounter. In particular, the ‘ownership model’ of property (Blomley 2004;
Singer 2001) plays a key role in facilitating both exclusion and extractive development by
upholding both a dualistic and a hierarchical view of nature–culture relations (Van Wagner
2017). This abstract and dephysicalised understanding of property detaches and severs people
(the owners) from place (the owned) By objectifying people-–place relations, the ownership
model privileges ‘productive’ land use and renders other relations severable or irrelevant, thus
failing to account for how places are embedded in complex networks of social and ecological
connection and relation.
Through property law, we recognise forms of control over, and use rights to, land through
ownership and its derivatives. These rights are held by the owner or those to whom they
transfer portions of their ‘bundle’ of rights. Ownership is classically understood to be ‘the
greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes’ (Honoré 1961,
107). We have a much more difficult time recognising relations with the land asserted by third
parties, particularly those premised on interdependence, reciprocity or responsibility. Indeed,
the dominance of the ownership model has made it difficult to even see other ways of
regulating relations with land and resources as property (Rose 1998, 141). These ‘non-owners’,
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who neither own nor control any part of the bundle, are presumed to be peripheral to the
central relations of ownership. Indeed, these relations are often understood to conflict with
and possibly threaten the core of property, whether this is described as the right to exclude or
the right to set the agenda (Katz 2008; Penner 1995). Yet, while property may be ‘owned’, it is
always already and continually becoming a place embedded in social and ecological relations
(Massey 2005). How we live with the places around us is central to facing the challenges of
overlapping environmental and social injustice. Bringing these expanded property relations to
the fore not only de-centres ownership in property relations, it calls into question the subject–
object dichotomy of the owner and the owned that makes the subordination of some rights and
interests to others not only possible but presumptive. By unsettling the ‘normative standing’ of
those outside the ownership relationship (Dorfman 2010, 17), these relations also provide
glimpses of how we might transform land use law to build relations of humility, reciprocity and
respect with each other and the ‘more-than-human’ world.
It’s all in the name: producing non-owners
In the simplest sense, the term ‘non-owner’ refers to anyone who does not own a particular
object of property. Traditionally, non-owners are defined by their distance and exclusion from
the primary legal relationship and their lack of enforceable interests. While they do have duties,
disabilities and liabilities vis-à-vis the owner, they do not have rights (Arnold 2013, 40). Nonowners may have relations about property, but these are defined and constrained by the rights
of the owner and corresponding duties to uphold owner rights even where doing so produces
‘dependence and vulnerability’ (Blomley 2020, 44). Further, these are relations with the owner
not the owned – the land, the waters, the other beings of a place. Indeed, the more-thanhumans that constitute the owned place have no status in property law except as being part
and parcel of the owned place, and thus have no recognised legal relations at all.
Central to relations between (human) owners and non-owners in the ownership model is
exclusivity. In the classic ownership model of property, the non-owners are those who owe the
‘duty of abstention’ to the owner who holds the right to prevent them from entering without
consent (Wyman 2017). This abstention is material – non-owners have no legal right to enter
land owned by someone else. However, it is also conceptual. Non-owners have no right to
determine what happens on the land, or how, or when (Katz 2011). While they may at times
make decisions that impact the land, these are generally associated with the exercise of rights
derivative of the owner’s rights (for example, an easement) or even acts of possession; they do
not have decision-making authority. Their actions can neither interfere nor conflict with the
owner’s agenda for their property. This is particularly true with respect to non-ownership
relations that are not derivative of the owner’s rights or anchored in the non-owner’s own
property ownership (such as duties owed between neighbours). Such relations with owned land
by definition challenge the severability, alienability and ultimately exclusivity of ownership. If,
as essentialist property theory contends, the function of property law is to ‘preserve’ this
agenda-setting position of the owner and to ensure that all non-owners ‘fall in line with the
owners agenda’, such relations are by definition excluded from legal recognition (Katz 2008,
315). Indeed, property law grounds the mobilisation of the state’s coercive powers to maintain
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these intersecting forms of exclusion that uphold the ‘relative standing’ of the owner (Blomley
2020, 43).
Yet, land use conflicts continue to arise because people routinely assert relationships with land
and resources that they are not formally recognised as owning but with which they are deeply
entangled (Blomley 2020; Van Wagner 2017). This chapter touches briefly on three examples:
the relations of Indigenous Peoples with fee simple lands within Canada; Māori ownership of
freshwater in Aotearoa New Zealand; and claims to public space made by unhoused persons.
Though these people–place relations are shaped by their legal definition as non-owner
relations, purportedly severed and obscured for legal decision-making, they continue to shape
formal legal property relations. As such, they deserve recognition as more than peripheral to
property law. Here, I reject the negative and residual category of the non-owner and adopt the
term ‘more-than-ownership’ to describe a range of relations to place that fall outside of the
boundaries of ownership (Van Wagner 2017). Rather, more-than-ownership emphasises the
complexity and unboundedness of places formally owned by others but deeply embedded in
socio-material relations, human and more-than-human. Rejecting the outsider status of this
wider set of relations also exposes how the privileges and exclusivity of the owner are ‘held up’
(Keenan 2010) by the ‘organized precarity’ (Blomley 2020) of others. By bringing these wider
relations into view, more-than-owners disrupt the orderly and productive management of place
through property law, and thus open space for the relational transformation of property
relations with place. More-than-ownership is not necessarily intended to privilege such
relations in disputes about land, though there are certainly situations in which doing so may be
appropriate for a range of legal, social and ethical reasons. The examples of Indigenous morethan-ownership discussed below point to the need for jurisdictional transformations that would
fundamentally reimagine the nature of the colonial state. Rather, it is intended to account for
the wider range of property relations than the traditional ownership model recognises. The
claims to public space and belonging on their own terms enacted through encampments
powerfully de-centre ownership in our collective negotiation of how we live together and care
for each other.
Put simply, if we are willing to take seriously our interconnectedness with both each other and
the living world, our decision-making structures must recognise that there is more than
ownership. Accounting for this wider web of relations moves beyond dualistic debates between
‘anthropocentric’ and ‘ecocentric’ perspectives, both of which are grounded in the assumption
that humans can and do exist outside of ‘nature’ (McShane 2007). Instead, as the examples
below illustrate, they push us to (re)build property systems not only to achieve more just
human relations, but to reintegrate these within the life-sustaining ecological systems of
particular places.
The original owners: the ‘non-ownership’ of Indigenous title holders
Indigenous title holders have relations with territory and hold authority through Indigenous
legal orders and systems of governance. Indeed, the very idea of property in land in settler
colonial societies rests on the question of how those living with and governing territory, whose
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relations shaped its places, could be transformed into non-owners by a later unilateral claim by
the Crown or, through it, private fee simple owners. The production of Indigenous territory as
property in land requires a specific set of legal moves to transform Indigenous relations with
territory into a proprietary object capable of dispossession (Nichols 2020, 30). Distinct
Indigenous relations with land, grounded in reciprocal relations of responsibility with the morethan-human world, are simultaneously recast as proprietary (in the colonial sense of control
and alienation) – but only to facilitate their transfer into the unilateral control of the state title,
enabling both exclusion and alienation. As Nichols describes, through colonial doctrines
recognising Aboriginal or native title, ‘Indigenous peoples are figured as “original owners of the
land” but only retroactively, that is refracted backward through the process itself’ (Nichols
2020, 30).
This (re)production of land as an abstract alienable commodity is made possible through the
separation of people, and place-based legal orders, from places (Graham 2011). The severability
at the heart of colonial property relations thus enables the theft of land in part by producing
Indigenous ownership as non-ownership, peripheral to the primary ownership relationship, be
it so-called Crown or private land. While the common law may recognise specific rights to
harvest resources attached to Indigenous (non)ownership, or in some cases a form of title to
land (see, for example, Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia 2014), governing authority
continues to have very limited formal recognition. Indigenous claims to ownership and
jurisdiction are formally filtered through settler-colonial state law to produce ‘partial
recognition and selective affirmation’, which obscure or even attempt to extinguish the
jurisdictional authority to control land and resources grounded in Indigenous legal orders
(Nichols 2020, 32). Yet, disputes about decision-making power and responsibility in relation to
land and resources continue to emerge in nations such as Canada, the United States, Australia
and New Zealand. As the case studies below demonstrate, this relationship between settler
colonial property law and Indigenous relations with territory remains highly unsettled. The
responsibility-based jurisdiction over land that Indigenous nations continue to assert demands
that settler legal systems confront existing structures of property relations to fully account for
their rich and reciprocal people–place relations.
Consultation as non-ownership: private land and Indigenous jurisdiction in Canadian courts
While the relationship between privately owned lands and Indigenous interests is unsettled in
Canadian law, Canadian courts often avoid uncomfortable questions by presuming that fee
simple interests largely, or entirely, extinguish the place-based legal orders and relations that
have for millennia regulated the territories now making up Canada (Borrows 2015; Christie
2009). Prior Indigenous title holders are deemed non-owners, even trespassers, and the later
fee simple owner is affirmed as the primary decision-maker without interrogating the
lawfulness of the underlying property relations. The paradoxical result is that the only
constitutionally protected property rights in Canada – those of Indigenous people recognised
and affirmed by section 35 of the Canadian Constitution – are presumptively subordinate to
subsequent and non-constitutional fee simple ownership rights. Indeed, even where such rights
are recognised in particular places, Canadian courts have provided that they can ‘justifiably’
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infringe on them for a wide range of settler socio-economic goals, including settlement and
resource extraction with the benefits flowing to private third parties (R v Sparrow 1990;
Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997). Thus, while owners must operate within the boundaries
of state land use frameworks, private owners are given both formal and informal jurisdiction
over decisions with profound implications for the social and ecological relations of Indigenous
territories.
At the heart of this is the failure to treat Indigenous law as law, and therefore Indigenous
interests in land as cognisable. This is the foundation of the unquestioned acceptance of Crown
sovereignty and underlying title by Canadian courts (McNeil 2018). As the Supreme Court
pronounced early in its engagement with the constitutional protection of Indigenous rights,
‘there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed
underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown’ (R v Sparrow 1990 at 1103). This fiction of
underlying title not only vests ‘extraordinary proprietary power in the Crown’ (Christie 2009), it
lays the foundation for a narrow view of both the relationship between Indigenous parties and
fee simple lands and Crown obligations in the context of private property (Van Wagner 2021a).
With underlying title, the Crown was free to – and did – grant lands to third parties as it wished,
lawfully severing those lands from the prior existing Indigenous relations and producing new
owners and non-owners in Canadian law.
Much of the case law on Indigenous relations with private land is in the context of resource
extraction and the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous
peoples’ interests. The duty applies prospectively, requiring the Crown to undertake
consultation prior to making decisions or allowing impactful activities on Indigenous territories
(Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 2004). Both the Crown and fee simple
title holders have argued that the duty simply does not apply on fee simple lands (Hupacasath
First Nation v British Columbia 2005 at para 165; Saugeen First Nation v Ontario (MNRF) 2017 at
paras 30, 63; Chartrand v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)
2015). This position was accepted without authority or detailed reasons by the Alberta Court of
Appeal in Paul First Nation v Parkland (County) (2006). Other courts and tribunals have not fully
adopted this position (Chartrand v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource
Operations) 2015; Timberwest v Deputy Administrator 2003 at 40; Hupacasath First Nation v
British Columbia 2005; Saugeen First Nation v Ontario (MNRF) 2017). However, the application
of the duty in practice has both affirmed Crown sovereignty and upheld the primacy of private
ownership (Van Wagner 2021a, 2021b). While Indigenous relations with place may provide
context for the scope of a procedural requirement, they do not ground enforceable authority or
cognisable interests in land (Collins and Sossin 2019, 335). Indigenous governing authority is
placed outside the frame of legal relevance both because Indigenous parties are legally deemed
to be non-owners, with at best ‘highly attenuated’ rights (Hupacasath First Nation v British
Columbia 2005), and because Crown policy deems fee simple lands unavailable to settle historic
claims. This narrow view of the relationship between Indigenous interests and private property
is driven, in part, by concerns about ‘innocent’ third party interests of those now in possession
of fee simple lands (Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (Attorney General) 2000). Without
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interrogation into their legal basis, the mere existence of fee simple property relations
forecloses the possibility of meaningfully recognising Indigenous relations with place.
Yet, Indigenous nations continue to assert relationships and governing authority in relation to
private land in a range of contexts, particularly resource extraction (Van Wagner 2021a).
Indeed, at the time of writing, there were five ongoing cases in which the relationship between
Aboriginal title and fee simple was at issue in British Columbia alone (Giesbrecht v British
Columbia (Attorney General) 2020 at para 31). These assertions remind us that where land use
decisions implicate Indigenous relations with territory, Indigenous interests cannot be
presumed to be extinguished by fee simple title – even where this realisation raises
uncomfortable questions about settler property interests (Borrows 2015). Indeed, they not only
expose foundational contradictions in Canadian property law but also open up space to
transform our understanding of ownership to account for a much wider set of relations with
place.
Indigenous title, grounded in Indigenous law, is not equivalent to fee simple title. Indeed, even
the construct of Aboriginal title in Canadian law recognises that Indigenous relations with land
are distinct, in part because they are collective in nature (Delgamuukw v British Columbia
1997). This collectively held title necessarily has an inherent governance element; the fee
simple bundle does not. Indigenous claims about private property therefore require us to
confront what happens to this collective jurisdiction when colonial law purports to have
transformed Indigenous title into non-ownership. Despite the agenda-setting authority of the
owner, this governing authority cannot be subsumed by individual fee simple ownership. Even
if we assume that the jurisdictional element of Indigenous title could have been presumptively
transferred to the Crown through the assertion of underlying title, our consideration of the
relationship between private landowners and Indigenous title holders is not limited to whether
and in what circumstances it would be appropriate to unsettle the formal ownership of the land
and resources. Rather, it must include consideration of whether and how jurisdictional
authority vis-à-vis privately owned property, now purportedly exercised by the Crown, could be
restored to Indigenous title holders. This would recognise Indigenous relations with land as
more-than-ownership interests rather than peripheral non-ownership. A broad range of
environmental and land use authority could be restored for Indigenous nations to uphold the
relationships with, and responsibilities to, the lands, waters and other beings of a particular,
and much less private, place.
This may raise a number of logistical complexities, such as how non-Indigenous interest holders
in a particular territory will be represented in decision-making processes. But these are not
insurmountable. All systems of governance and property relations change and develop to
account for an array of interests – both internal and external. Indigenous systems of law are no
different and indeed have a long history of interfacing with colonial legal interests. Nor do the
potential challenges justify foreclosing the possibility of reconciling fee simple ownership
interests with the more-than-owner jurisdiction of Indigenous nations. The current system of
property relations has demonstrably contributed to crises of profound inequality and ecological
breakdown. Indeed, directly grappling with the complexity of pluralistic property relations
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presents a powerful opportunity to rebuild relations with the land and each other in ways that
respond to urgent calls for social, economic and ecological transformation.
Māori more-than-owner relations with freshwater: from non-ownership to jurisdiction
Recognising more-than-owner relations exposes the challenges of reconciling legal systems
grounded in different worldviews. However, it simultaneously opens up the possibility for the
novel solutions and legal creativity we desperately require. The legal relations between Māori
and freshwater have a long legal history inside and outside the courts in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Contemporary Māori claims to freshwater are embedded in an enduring assertion of Māori law
and jurisdiction in the face of colonial dispossession and the imposition of colonial law. Crown–
Māori relations with respect to freshwater are also grounded in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi,
the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand. The Māori text of the Treaty expressly
protects both tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) and taonga (treasures). The English text
guarantees ‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession’ of property. Thus, on its face, the Treaty
appears to recognise the status of Māori as owners of their territories and resources. Yet, the
reality of Crown–Māori has been quite different, with ownership and jurisdiction consistently
undermined through legal and political means.
New Zealand courts and the Waitangi Tribunal have recognised some proprietary rights in
relation to water beds and bodies (summarised in Waitangi Tribunal 2012). Yet the Crown
consistently took the position that Māori did not have ownership rights because water was
incapable of ownership in the common law until it was captured and contained. The complex
genealogical, metaphysical and responsibility-based relations asserted by iwi (tribe) in relation
to particular bodies of water may be factors to be taken into account in regulatory decisionmaking (see the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) Part II) or the basis for novel models of
shared decision making (see, for example, section 14 of the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River
Claims Settlement Act) 2017 (NZ), which recognises the Whanganui River as a legal person). But,
as non-ownership rights, these procedural rights do not confer proprietary rights or governing
authority in relation to freshwater. Despite the Crown’s position that freshwater is incapable of
being owned, in practice the Crown has not only acted like the owner. Instead, the Crown has
created and granted comprehensive rights to private third parties to use and develop
freshwater resources. Therefore, while everyone is formally a non-owner in the Crown’s
framing, in reality it was Māori relations with freshwater that were subordinated to the
exercise of ownership-like rights by others, and for the benefit of others.
Freshwater ownership came into the spotlight when the New Zealand Māori Council launched a
Waitangi Tribunal claim about a plan to partially privatise state-owned hydroelectric resources.
The Council alleged that the plan ignored ongoing claims by Māori to the ownership over water
resources and therefore breached the Crown’s treaty obligation to protect Māori taonga
(Waitangi Tribunal 2012, 32). A two-stage Waitangi Tribunal inquiry into Māori relations with
freshwater examined the claims in detail. Stage 1 examined the proprietary claims and found
that Māori do have treaty-protected ownership interests over water resources in New Zealand.
Stage 2 found that the water allocation and management regime in the country did not meet
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the Crown’s treaty obligation to protect resources owned by the Māori (Waitangi Tribunal
2019). The Tribunal findings are now informing both legislative reform processes and legal
actions by multiple iwi to establish tino rangatiratanga over freshwater resources in their
traditional territory (Ellis 2021). They are also informing the unfolding of broader social and
legal reimagining of people–place relations.
The Māori Council framed the freshwater claim in the language of ownership to align with the
guarantee of property in the English version of the Treaty (Waitangi Tribunal 2012). While on
one hand the ownership framing is conceptually limited by its grounding in common law
property relations, and the doctrine of Aboriginal title, it served to strategically recentre Māori
relations with freshwater. By foregrounding the link between political authority and proprietary
rights at the heart of tino rangatiratanga, it profoundly challenged the idea of ownership itself
(Durie 2017). There is no Māori word for the English concept of ownership, and indeed some of
the witnesses spoke to its limitations as a descriptor of their relationship with land and water
territory (Waitangi Tribunal 2012, 62). The Crown argued that this conceptual mismatch
undermined the proprietary nature of the claim, characterising Māori relations with freshwater
as better aligned with kaitiakitanga, often translated as custodianship or stewardship. This, the
Crown argued, upheld the responsibilities to taonga, but did not include the proprietary
interests claimed.
Characterising Māori claims as ‘environmental’ concerns is a strategy used by the Crown to
place them outside the scope of particular decisions (Bargh and Van Wagner 2019). Māori
interests flowing from kaitiakitanga are thus characterised as peripheral to the Crown’s
jurisdiction over ‘public’ resources and their regulation in the ‘public interest’. This is consistent
with the adoption of a ‘right-to-culture model’ of Māori rights, as opposed to and preferred by
the Crown to property and ‘political authority’ models (Erueti 2016, 60). Where the Crown
claims to support tino rangatiratanga, it does so in opposition to claims framed through
proprietary rights, beneficial interests and governing authority. Rooted in non-ownership rights,
Māori jurisdiction is equated with co-management frameworks or representation in
environmental decision making (Durie 2017).
In the freshwater inquiry, the Tribunal concluded that the claimants did hold ownership
interests in freshwater at the time of the Treaty. But the Tribunal also went further. Rather than
subsume the Māori relationship with freshwater within common law ownership, or adopt the
Crown’s narrower cultural rights characterisation, the Tribunal characterised Māori interests as
‘more than ownership’. The claimants did demonstrate they had ‘full-blown’ ownership in 1840
at the time of the Treaty, while ‘English-style ownership’ fails to capture the much broader set
of relations and obligations between Māori and their taonga (Waitangi Tribunal 2012, 76).
Thus, while relations with freshwater include interests akin to ownership, te tino rangitiratanga
‘exists beyond mere ownership, use, or exclusive possession; it concerns personal and tribal
identity, Maori authority and control, and the right to continuous access [to taonga], subject to
Maori cultural preferences’ (Waitangi Tribunal 2012, 76, citing the He Maunga Rongo: Report
on Central North Island Claims). Freshwater is therefore not simply deemed to be capable of
ownership in the common law sense. Rather, freshwater bodies are brought into relation with
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the human communities that have developed place-based systems embedded in relations of
care, responsibility and reciprocity. Thus, rights to use and control freshwater are not simply
indicia of power over it. Rather, they are tools to fulfil duties and uphold relationships for the
benefit of the living world, including our own embedded selves. What the Tribunal’s conclusion
means in practice is still being determined and there is much to be cautious about with respect
to the Crown’s response. Nonetheless, it is clear that Māori relations with freshwater have
unsettled the dominant narrative about what property is, and what ownership means, in
potentially transformative ways (Durie 2017; E. J. Macpherson 2019).
The commoners: homeless encampments, public property, and the right not to be excluded
While assertions of Indigenous more-than-owner relations fundamentally challenge the role of
the settler colonial state to structure property relations and govern relations with place,
conflicts about the use of public space present a different form of disruption to the dominant
ownership model of property by de-centring ownership from decision-making about how we
live together in community. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the context of tent
encampments established by unhoused persons in public spaces. These material manifestations
of claims to the human right to housing, to basic dignity and security, are inherently disruptive
to the property relations grounded on the primacy of the right to exclude (Hamill 2018). While
governments often assert their private ownership of public space in response to encampments,
the parks, ravines and other public lands on which they are established are the shared spaces of
contemporary communities. Encampment residents bring the more-than-ownership relations
of these spaces into view by centring the public dimension of these spaces and contesting both
presumptions about the role of exclusivity in state-ownership of property and the primacy of
property-owning neighbours in the governance of public space.
Canadian cities have long been grappling with the expansion of homeless encampments on
public lands (see early cases, such as Vancouver Parks Board v Mickelson 2003, and a line of
more recent cases starting with Victoria (City) v Adams 2009). Despite commitments at all levels
of government to the right to housing (National Housing Strategy Act 2019; Toronto 2019),
more than 235,000 people experience homelessness in Canada every year (Strobel et al. 2021).
Indigenous Peoples are disproportionately unhoused in Canada due to the overlapping and
ongoing social, cultural and economic effects of colonialism. They are also significantly less
likely to use existing shelter systems. Indeed, in Toronto, Canada’s largest city, more than onethird of encampment residents are Indigenous (Toronto 2018). For Indigenous peoples, being
unhoused compounds the intergenerational impact of land dispossession, loss of language, and
breakdown of kinship relations (Thistle 2017). In this context, encampments should be
understood as more than just collections of transient or temporary shelters. Without
romanticising the hardships and profound deprivation associated with being unhoused, for
many residents they are also assertions of relations with place and community in the face of
the state’s failure to uphold Treaty promises and Indigenous rights, as well as basic human
rights to housing, dignity and equality (Young, Abbott and Goebel 2017; Thistle 2017; Speer
2018). These relations with place are about physical survival in the face of state-created
homelessness, and they are simultaneously enactments of alternative social and material
9

relations of mutual aid and belonging in the face of experiences of profound social exclusion
and discrimination (Young, Abbott and Goebel 2017). As such, while the relations built by
encampment residents necessarily respond to dominant structures of property relations, they
are not defined by the presumptive boundaries of the ownership model. Indeed, the challenge
they pose to existing hierarchies of property rights is illustrated by the state’s resort to trespass
as the bluntest available legal tool to re-assert powers of exclusion.
Government responses to encampments not only characterise the property relations of
encampment residents as peripheral to the underlying ownership of public space; they actively
construct them as hostile to the proper role and use of public property. Legal authority for
encampment evictions (or ‘clearings’, as they are euphemistically referred to) in the name of
order and public safety has been further entrenched by the dual processes of financialisation
and gentrification reshaping both housing and public space in Canadian cities (Hermer et al.
2020; Amster 2003; Blomley 2013; Herring 2019). The public nature of places such as parks is
obscured by the assertion of governments’ private ownership and increasingly their readiness
to protect the entitlement of property-owning neighbours to ‘their’ local amenities. By-laws
prohibiting overnight camping and the erection of shelters are used to ground trespass notices
posted on tents and trees and then enforced by police and private security. By emphasising the
powers flowing from ownership, including all the rights of control and exclusion associated with
private property (Gordon and Byron 2021; Skolnik 2016), governments actively obscure the
human rights duties and obligations they owe to encampment residents occupying public
space. Through property law, unhoused persons are transformed from fellow rights-holding
residents to trespassers. Their non-ownership status is compounded by the characterisation of
their presence as transient and risky to both themselves and housed neighbours. Not
understood as residents of neighbourhoods, they are simply ‘sleeping outside’ in seemingly
random locations. The tents or other structures are transformed from homes into
‘encroachments’, ‘hazards’ and even ‘litter’, and thus made both unlawful and dangerous.
Encampments are cleared to provide for the ‘restoration’ of public spaces to their safe and
proper aesthetic and recreational uses, which often include commercial uses such as film
production and pop-up cafés and restaurants that generate revenue for local governments
(Speer 2018; Flynn and Thorpe 2021). Indeed, encampments often trigger a counter-assertion
of exclusion of ‘the public’. Characterising them as hostile, smelly and ugly, government and
public narratives depict encampments as exclusionary of the proper users of public space – the
good propertied citizens who want to walk their dog and play in the playground (Black v
Toronto 2020). The ‘public’ in public space is thus produced in opposition to the uses of
encampment residents who, without their own recognised property claims, are placed outside
society and the obligations of the state (Hamill 2018; Grear 2003).
Governments actively use the peripherality of non-owner interests to deny they have
obligations to encampment residents, such as the provision of basic services, a duty of
consultation, and ultimately protections against forced evictions. Despite legal protections of
human rights, including protection against forced evictions, governments contend that
encampment residents are without any lawful and enforceable claim to their homes,
belongings and communities. In this sense, non-ownership status not only facilitates the
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physical exclusion of encampment residences from particular public spaces, it underscores their
exclusion from a public with legitimate and lawful interests in public places. Or any place at all.
The punitive enforcement of dominant property relations through seemingly mundane, yet
violently asserted and enforced, by-laws becomes de facto housing policy for governments
failing to address the rapidly growing housing crisis. Thus, not only are the rights of
encampment residents subordinated to the owner’s agenda, they are deemed never to have
existed at all.
Yet the more-than-owner relations enacted by encampment residents actively resist a
conception of public space as property that centres exclusivity at the expense of their belonging
(Keenan 2010). Formal legal claims pursued by residents alongside ongoing political advocacy
have resulted in key moments of destabilisation of dominant narratives (Buhler 2009). These
judicial imaginings envision homeless people as having a right to be in public space and make
choices about their own survival, even if only temporarily, while rejecting narratives of
homeless people as ‘threats’ to the social and economic value of public spaces (Victoria (City) v
Adams 2009; Abbotsford v Shantz 2015). Canadian courts have expressly distinguished
encampment cases from legal property claims, instead grounding them in the constitutionally
protected security of the person (see Victoria (City) v Adams 2009). However, examining
assertions of belonging made by encampment residents on their own terms reveals deep
contestations about how dominant property relations are used to structure how we live
together and share our common space. They push us beyond the narrative that residents can
be ‘evicted’ because they had no right to be there in the first place. How can one be a nonowner, even a trespasser, on land that is owned for the benefit of the public to which we
ostensibly belong? At the very least, echoing C. B. Macpherson’s classic sentiment, they have a
right not to be excluded (C. B. Macpherson 1962). Property relations being enacted in
encampments thus expose a fundamental underlying conflict about the rights and interests
upheld by dominant property relations. They starkly illustrate how recognising more-thanownership interests is a matter not only of material survival, but also of collectively defining the
nature of belonging in the places we share.
Conclusion: more-than-ownership as an invitation to relation
Recognising a broader set of relations with place – including relations of reciprocity,
responsibility and belonging – requires a transformation of our legal and cultural
understandings of ownership. As the examples discussed here illustrate, many non-owner
relations deemed peripheral to property law are in fact central to the ways we live together
with particular places. These moves towards more-than-ownership are not simply efforts to
restore or shift ownership, as traditionally conceived, to different parties. They demand a much
deeper transformation of what we mean by ownership and how it structures our decisionmaking from the mythical foundation of Crown sovereignty to the day-to-day enforcement of
municipal by-laws. This may include shifting formal title to more-than-owners; indeed, in the
case of Indigenous title holders, this will be part of what is necessary and just in the face of
ongoing settler colonialism. But foregrounding more-than-ownership is about a much broader
reimagining of people–place relations – from Indigenous environmental jurisdiction on private
11

lands to recognition of place-based reciprocal relations with land and water territory to the
(re)commoning of public space through networks of belonging and the right not to be excluded.
The willingness to learn, to see, and to recognise how much more there is than ownership is
part of the necessary work of rebuilding a system of property that sustains us as relational
beings embedded in the complex materiality of places.
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the Crown Minerals Act 1991 Block Offer Process.” Journal of Human Rights and the
Environment 10, no. 1: 118–39.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2004. “The Boundaries of Property: Lessons from Beatrix Potter.” Canadian
Geographer 48, no. 2: 91–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-3658.2004.00049.x.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2013. “What Kind of Legal Space Is a City?” In Urban Interstices: The
Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-Between, edited by Andrea Brighenti, 87–103.
Farnham: Ashgate. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315548807.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2020. “Precarious Territory: Property Law, Housing, and the Socio-Spatial
Order.” Antipode 52, no. 1: 36–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12578.
Borrows, John. 2015. “Aboriginal Title and Private Property.” Supreme Court Law Review:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 71, no. 5: 91–134.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol71/iss1/5/?utm_source=digitalcommo
ns.osgoode.yorku.ca%2Fsclr%2Fvol71%2Fiss1%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign
=PDFCoverPages.
Buhler, Sarah. 2009. “Cardboard Boxes and Invisible Fences: Homelessness and Public Space in
City Victoria v. Adams Case Comments.” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 27, no. 1:
209–28. https://doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v27i1.4568.
Christie, Gordon. 2009. “Aboriginal Title and Private Property.” In Aboriginal Law since
Delgamuukw, edited by Maria Morellato, 177–204. Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book.
Collins, Lynda, and Lorne Sossin. 2019. “In Search of an Ecological Approach to Constitutional
Principles and Environmental Discretion in Canada.” UBC Law Review 52, no. 1: 293–
343.

12

Cooper, Davina. 2007. “Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the
Productive Life of Property.” Law & Social Inquiry 32, no. 3: 625–64.
Dorfman, Avihay. 2010. “Private Ownership.” Legal Theory 16, no. 1: 1–35.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325210000042.
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